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Abstract. We provide an equilibrium analysis of a wage bargaining model between a union and
a firm in which the union must choose between strike and holdout in case of a disagreement. While
in the literature it is assumed that the parties of wage bargaining have constant discount factors,
in our model preferences of the union and the firm are expressed by sequences of discount rates
varying in time. First, we describe necessary conditions under arbitrary sequences of discount rates
for the supremum of the union’s payoffs and the infimum of the firm’s payoffs under subgame perfect
equilibrium in all periods when the given party makes an offer. Then, we determine the equilibrium
payoffs for particular cases of sequences of discount rates varying in time. Besides deriving the exact
bounds of equilibrium payoffs, we also characterize the equilibrium strategy profiles that support
these extreme payoffs.
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1 Introduction
There are numerous works in the literature that generalize Rubinstein’s bargaining model
of alternative offers (Rubinstein (1982)); for surveys, see e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein
(1990), Muthoo (1999). One extension of that model concerns incorporating the choice
of going on strike in union-firm negotiations. Such a generalized model with the same
discount rate δ for both parties is presented e.g. in Haller and Holden (1990) and Holden
(1994). It is assumed that in each period until an agreement is reached, the union must
decide whether it will strike or hold out in that period. The same wage bargaining but with
the union and the firm having different discount rates δu and δf is studied in Fernandez
and Glazer (1991). In this model, referred here as the F-G model, the union achieves the
maximum-wage contract by threatening an alternating strike strategy (to go on strike
when the firm rejects an offer but to continue working at the old contract wage when
the firm makes an unacceptable offer). As shown by Bolt (1995), this subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE) only holds if δu ≤ δf . If, however, δu > δf , then the firm can increase
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its payoff by playing the so called no-concession strategy (reject all offers of the union
and make always unacceptable offers). In this case, the SPE is restored by modifying
the alternating strike strategies. Houba and Wen (2008) apply the method of Shaked and
Sutton (1984) to derive the exact bounds of equilibrium payoffs in the original F-G model
and characterize the equilibrium strategy profiles that support these extreme equilibrium
payoffs for all discount factors.
While several works in the literature concern the F-G model, it is usually assumed
that the parties have constant discount rates. However, usually in real life discount rates
of the parties are not really constant. Patience of bargainers may be changing over time
due to many circumstances (e.g., political, economic, financial, social, environmental).
To the best of our knowledge, our previous work on wage bargaining (Ozkardas and
Rusinowska (2014)) is the first one in which the issue of changing patience of the union
and the firm in the F-G model is addressed. More precisely, in Ozkardas and Rusinowska
(2014) we generalize the F-G model to the union-firm wage bargaining in which both
parties have preferences expressed by sequences (δu,t)t∈N and (δf,t)t∈N of discount factors
varying in time. We determine SPE for three cases when the strike decision of the union
is exogenous: the case when the union is committed to go on strike in each period in
which there is a disagreement, the case when the union is committed to go on strike
only when its own offer is rejected, and the case when the union is supposed to go never
on strike. We show that while in the original F-G model the exogenous ‘always-strike’
case coincides with Rubinstein’s model, it is not the case in the generalized framework.
We present the unique SPE for this case and also for each of the remaining two cases.
Furthermore, we consider the general model with no assumption on the commitment to
strike and find subgame perfect equilibria for some particular cases.
The aim of the present paper is to continue our research on the wage bargaining
initiated in Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2014) and to find the extreme payoffs under SPE in
the wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time. In order to achieve that, we apply
to our generalized model the method used in Houba and Wen (2008). First, we describe
necessary conditions under arbitrary sequences of discount rates for the supremum of
the union’s SPE payoffs and the infimum of the firm’s SPE payoffs in all periods when
the given party makes an offer. Then, we determine the extreme payoffs under SPE for
particular cases of sequences of discount rates varying in time. Apart from deriving the
exact bounds of the equilibrium payoffs, we also characterize the equilibrium strategy
profiles that support these extreme payoffs. Our findings for the model with varying
discount rates generalize the results of Houba and Wen (2008) obtained for the model
with constant discount rates.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we briefly present
the generalized wage bargaining model with discount rates varying in time. In Section 3
necessary conditions for the supremum of the union’s SPE payoffs and the infimum of
the firm’s SPE payoffs are determined. In Section 4 we calculate the extreme payoffs for
particular cases of the sequences of discount rates varying in time. We also present equi-
librium strategy profiles that support these payoffs. Section 5 contains some concluding
remarks. Proofs of all results are presented in the Appendix.
2
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2 Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time
The point of departure of our study is the following bargaining procedure between the
union and the firm, presented in Fernandez and Glazer (1991), and Haller and Holden
(1990). There is an existing wage contract, that specifies the wage that a worker is entitled
to per day of work, which has come up for renegotiation. Two parties (union and firm)
bargain sequentially over discrete time and a potentially infinite horizon. They alternate
in making offers of wage contracts that the other party can either accept or reject. When
a party rejects a proposed wage contract, the union must decide whether or not to strike
in that period. Under the previous contract w0, where w0 ∈ [0, 1], the union and the firm
gets w0 and 1− w0, respectively. By a new contract W ∈ [0, 1], the union will receive W
and the firm 1−W . Figure 1 presents the first three periods of this wage bargaining.
ABOUT HERE FIGURE 1
More precisely, the bargaining procedure is the following. The union proposes x0. If
the firm accepts the new wage contract, the agreement is reached and the payoffs are
(x0, 1− x0). If the firm rejects it, then the union can either strike, and then both parties
obtain (0, 0) in the current period, or continue with the previous contract with payoffs
(w0, 1−w0). If the union goes on strike, it is the firm’s turn to make a new offer y1, where
y1 is assigned to the union and (1 − y1) to the firm. This procedure continues until an
agreement is reached, where x2t denotes the offer of the union made in an even-numbered
period 2t, and y2t+1 denotes the offer of the firm made in an odd-numbered period (2t+1).
Our generalization of the original F-G model concerns preferences of the union and
the firm and, as a consequence, the payoff functions of both parties. While Fernandez
and Glazer (1991) assume stationary preferences described by constant discount rates δu
and δf , we analyze a wage bargaining in which preferences of the union and the firm are
described by sequences of discount factors (rates) varying in time, (δu,t)t∈N and (δf,t)t∈N,
respectively, where
δu,t = discount factor of the union in period t ∈ N, δu,0 = 1, 0 < δu,0 < 1 for t ≥ 1
δf,t = discount factor of the firm in period t ∈ N, δf,0 = 1, 0 < δf,0 < 1 for t ≥ 1
The result of the wage bargaining is either a pair (W,T ), where W is the wage contract
agreed upon and T ∈ N is the number of proposals rejected in the bargaining, or a
disagreement denoted by (0,∞) and meaning the situation in which the parties never
reach an agreement. We introduce the following notation. Let for each t ∈ N
δu(t) :=
t∏
k=0
δu,k, δf (t) :=
t∏
k=0
δf,k (1)
and for 0 < t′ ≤ t
δu(t
′, t) :=
δu(t)
δu(t′ − 1)
=
t∏
k=t′
δu,k, δf (t
′, t) :=
δf (t)
δf (t′ − 1)
=
t∏
k=t′
δf,k (2)
3
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.11
The utility of the result (W,T ) for the union is equal to
U(W,T ) =
∞∑
t=0
δu(t)ut (3)
where ut = W for each t ≥ T , and if T > 0 then for each 0 ≤ t < T
ut = 0 if there is a strike in period t ∈ N
ut = w0 if there is no strike in period t.
The utility of the result (W,T ) for the firm is equal to
V (W,T ) =
∞∑
t=0
δf (t)vt (4)
where vt = 1−W for each t ≥ T , and if T > 0 then for each 0 ≤ t < T
vt = 0 if there is a strike in period t
vt = 1− w0 if there is no strike in period t.
The utility of the disagreement is equal to
U(0,∞) = V (0,∞) = 0 (5)
We assume that the infinite series in (3) and (4) are convergent. A sufficient condition
for the convergence of (3) and (4) is to assume that the sequences of discount rates
(δu,t)t∈N and (δf,t)t∈N are bounded by a certain number smaller than 1, i.e.,
there exist a < 1 and b < 1 such that δu,t ≤ a and δf,t ≤ b for each t ∈ N (6)
Let ∆u(t) and ∆f (t) denote the generalized discount factors of the union and the firm
in period t, respectively. They take into account the sequences of discount rates varying
in time and the fact that the utilities are defined by the discounted streams of payoffs.
They are defined as follows, for every t ∈ N+:
∆u(t) :=
∑
∞
k=t δu(t, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=t δu(t, k)
, ∆f (t) :=
∑
∞
k=t δf (t, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=t δf (t, k)
(7)
and consequently, for every t ∈ N+
1−∆u(t) =
1
1 +
∑
∞
k=t δu(t, k)
, 1−∆f (t) =
1
1 +
∑
∞
k=t δf (t, k)
(8)
Note that for every t ∈ N+
∞∑
k=t
δf (t, k) ≥
∞∑
k=t
δu(t, k) if and only if ∆f (t) ≥ ∆u(t)
For the special case of constant discount rates, i.e., if δu,t = δu and δf,t = δf for every
t ∈ N+, ∆u(t) = δu and ∆f (t) = δf .
4
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3 Necessary conditions in the generalized wage bargaining
Houba and Wen (2008) apply the method of Shaked and Sutton (1984) to the F-G model
to derive the supremum of the union’s SPE payoffs in any even period and the infimum
of the firm’s SPE payoffs in any odd period. We generalize their method to the wage
bargaining with sequences of discount rates varying in time. Let for t ∈ N
M2tu = supremum of the union’s SPE payoffs in any even period 2t where the union
makes an offer
m2t+1f = infimum of the firm’s SPE payoffs in any odd 2t+ 1 period where the firm
makes an offer
M2tu and m
2t+1
f depend on the sequences (δu,t)t∈N, (δf,t)t∈N, and 0 ≤ w0 ≤ 1. Since in
this model w0 is the union’s worst SPE payoff (see Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2014)), we
have for each t ∈ N
w0 ≤M
2t
u ≤ 1 and w0 ≤ 1−m
2t+1
f ≤ 1
In this section, we determine necessary conditions forM2tu andm
2t+1
f , where t ∈ N. The
analysis is practically the same as the one given in Houba and Wen (2008) for constant
discount rates, except that we consider periods 2t and 2t+1, and the generalized discount
factors ∆i(t) in a given period t ∈ N instead of constant discount rates δi for i = u, f . For
coherence of the exposition, we present this analysis for the generalized case. We have for
all (δu,t)t∈N, (δf,t)t∈N, 0 ≤ w0 ≤ 1 and t ∈ N
M2tu ≤ max

w0(1−∆f (2t+ 1)) + (1−m
2t+1
f )∆f (2t+ 1) (9a)
w0(1−∆u(2t+ 1)) + (1−m
2t+1
f )∆u(2t+ 1) (9b)
1−m2t+1f ∆f (2t+ 1) subject to (1−m
2t+1
f )∆u(2t+ 1) ≥ w0 (9c)
(9)
To see that, consider an arbitrary even period 2t, t ∈ N. First of all, note that for i = u, f
1− (1−w0)(1−∆i(2t+1))−m
2t+1
f ∆i(2t+1) = w0(1−∆i(2t+1))+(1−m
2t+1
f )∆i(2t+1)
(1) If the union holds out after its offer is rejected, the firm will get at least
(1− w0)(1−∆f (2t+ 1)) +m
2t+1
f ∆f (2t+ 1)
by rejecting the union’s offer. Hence, the union’s SPE payoffs must be at most
1− (1− w0)(1−∆f (2t+ 1))−m
2t+1
f ∆f (2t+ 1) (10)
from making the least acceptable offer, or
w0(1−∆u(2t+ 1)) + (1−m
2t+1
f )∆u(2t+ 1) (11)
from making an unacceptable offer.
5
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(2) The union may threaten to strike in period 2t if the firm rejects its offer, which is
credible if and only if (1 −m2t+1f )
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δu(2t + 1, k) ≥ w0 + w0
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δu(2t + 1, k),
i.e., if and only if
(1−m2t+1f )∆u(2t+ 1) ≥ w0
In this case, the union’s SPE payoffs must be smaller than or equal to
1−m2t+1f ∆f (2t+ 1) (12)
from making the least acceptable offer, or
(1−m2t+1f )∆u(2t+ 1) (13)
from making an unacceptable offer. Note that we have always
1−∆u(2t+ 1) ≥ m
2t+1
f (∆f (2t+ 1)−∆u(2t+ 1))
which is equivalent to
1−m2t+1f ∆f (2t+ 1) ≥ (1−m
2t+1
f )∆u(2t+ 1)
This means that if the union threatens to strike, it will not make an unacceptable offer
in period 2t. Hence, the union’s SPE payoffs cannot be greater than the maximum of the
three cases (10), (11) and (12), and therefore we obtain (9).
From (9) we get the necessary conditions for the supremum of the union’s SPE payoffs
in an even period:
Proposition 1 We have for all (δu,t)t∈N, (δf,t)t∈N, 0 ≤ w0 ≤ 1 and t ∈ N
M2tu ≤

1−m2t+1f ∆f (2t+ 1) if (15)
w0(1−∆f (2t+ 1)) + (1−m
2t+1
f )∆f (2t+ 1) if (16)
w0(1−∆u(2t+ 1)) + (1−m
2t+1
f )∆u(2t+ 1) if (17)
(14)
where
(1−m2t+1f )∆u(2t+ 1) ≥ w0 (15)
(1−m2t+1f )∆u(2t+ 1) < w0 and ∆f (2t+ 1) ≥ ∆u(2t+ 1) (16)
(1−m2t+1f )∆u(2t+ 1) < w0 and ∆f (2t+ 1) < ∆u(2t+ 1) (17)
For the proof of Proposition 1, see the Appendix.
Similarly, we have for all (δu,t)t∈N, (δf,t)t∈N, 0 ≤ w0 ≤ 1 and t ∈ N
m2t+1f ≥ min
max
{
1− w0(1−∆u(2t+ 2))−M
2t+2
u ∆u(2t+ 2) (18a)
1− w0(1−∆f (2t+ 2))−M
2t+2
u ∆f (2t+ 2) (18b)
1−M2t+2u ∆u(2t+ 2) subject to M
2t+2
u ∆u(2t+ 2) ≥ w0 (18c)
(18)
Consider an arbitrary odd period 2t+ 1, t ∈ N.
6
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(1) If the union holds out after rejecting the firm’s offer, the union will get at most
w0(1−∆u(2t+ 2)) +M
2t+2
u ∆u(2t+ 2)
Hence, the firm could get at least
1− w0(1−∆u(2t+ 2))−M
2t+2
u ∆u(2t+ 2) (19)
from making the least irresistible offer. The firm could receive at least
(1−w0)(1−∆f (2t+2))+(1−M
2t+2
u )∆f (2t+2) = 1−w0(1−∆f (2t+2))−M
2t+2
u ∆f (2t+2)
(20)
from making any unacceptable offer. The firm will make either the least irresistible offer
or an unacceptable offer, depending on whether (19) or (20) is greater. For the union,
it is always credible to holdout after rejecting a firm’s offer, as the union gets at most
M2t+2u ∆u(2t+ 2) when it strikes after the firm’s offer is rejected.
(2) If the union strikes after rejecting the firm’s offer, then the firm will get at least
1−M2t+2u ∆u(2t+ 2)
from making the least irresistible offer, or
(1−M2t+2u )∆f (2t+ 2)
from making an unacceptable offer. Since M2t+2u ≤ 1, note that
M2t+2u (∆u(2t+ 2)−∆f (2t+ 2)) ≤ 1−∆f (2t+ 2)
which is equivalent to
1−M2t+2u ∆u(2t+ 2) ≥ (1−M
2t+2
u )∆f (2t+ 2)
This implies that the firm will never make an unacceptable offer if the union threatens
to strike after rejecting the firm’s offer. Strike in period 2t + 1 is credible if and only if
M2t+2u
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k) ≥ w0 + w0
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k), i.e., if and only if
M2t+2u ∆u(2t+ 2) ≥ w0
Hence, we obtain (18).
From (18) we get the necessary conditions for the infimum of the firm’s SPE payoffs
in an odd period:
Proposition 2 We have for all (δu,t)t∈N, (δf,t)t∈N, 0 ≤ w0 ≤ 1 and t ∈ N
m2t+1f ≥

1−M2t+2u ∆u(2t+ 2) if (22)
1− w0(1−∆f (2t+ 2))−M
2t+2
u ∆f (2t+ 2) if (23)
1− w0(1−∆u(2t+ 2))−M
2t+2
u ∆u(2t+ 2) if (24)
(21)
where
M2t+2u (∆u(2t+ 2)−∆f (2t+ 2)) ≥ w0(1−∆f (2t+ 2)) (22)
M2t+2u (∆u(2t+ 2)−∆f (2t+ 2)) < w0(1−∆f (2t+ 2)) and ∆u(2t+ 2) > ∆f (2t+ 2)
(23)
∆u(2t+ 2) ≤ ∆f (2t+ 2) (24)
7
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For the proof of Proposition 2, see the Appendix.
Note that our Propositions 1 and 2 generalize the corresponding results on necessary
conditions for Mu and mf for the model with constant discount rates presented in Houba
and Wen (2008) (Propositions 2 and 1).
From Propositions 1 and 2 we can write the following fact which will be useful for
determining M2tu and m
2t+1
f for particular cases of the generalized discount factors.
Fact 1 Let t ∈ N.
(i) If ∆u(2t+ 1) ≤ ∆f (2t+ 1), then
M2tu ≤
{
1−m2t+1f ∆f (2t+ 1) if (1−m
2t+1
f )∆u(2t+ 1) ≥ w0
w0(1−∆f (2t+ 1)) + (1−m
2t+1
f )∆f (2t+ 1) if (1−m
2t+1
f )∆u(2t+ 1) < w0
(ii) If ∆u(2t+ 1) > ∆f (2t+ 1), then
M2tu ≤
{
1−m2t+1f ∆f (2t+ 1) if (1−m
2t+1
f )∆u(2t+ 1) ≥ w0
w0(1−∆u(2t+ 1)) + (1−m
2t+1
f )∆u(2t+ 1) if (1−m
2t+1
f )∆u(2t+ 1) < w0
(iii) If ∆u(2t+ 2) ≤ ∆f (2t+ 2), then
m2t+1f ≥ 1− w0(1−∆u(2t+ 2))−M
2t+2
u ∆u(2t+ 2)
(iv) If ∆u(2t+ 2) > ∆f (2t+ 2), then
m2t+1f ≥
{
1−M2t+2u ∆u(2t+ 2) if (25)
1−M2t+2u ∆f (2t+ 2)− w0(1−∆f (2t+ 2)) if (26)
where
M2t+2u (∆u(2t+ 2)−∆f (2t+ 2)) ≥ w0(1−∆f (2t+ 2)) (25)
M2t+2u (∆u(2t+ 2)−∆f (2t+ 2)) < w0(1−∆f (2t+ 2)) (26)
Since there exist infinitely many cases of the relation between the generalized discount
factors of the union and the firm in even and odd periods, and consequently, infinitely
many combinations of the necessary conditions, we cannot fully determineM2tu and m
2t+1
f
for all possibilities. However, given the sequences of discount rates, the corresponding
necessary conditions can be used to find M2tu and m
2t+1
f , if they exist.
4 Maximum wage contract in the generalized model
From the necessary conditions presented in the previous section, we now determine M2tu
and m2t+1f for t ∈ N for some particular cases of the discount rates varying in time. Let
∆u(t) and ∆f (t) for t ∈ N be the generalized discount rates of the union and the firm,
respectively, as defined in (7).
In order to simplify the presentation of the results, first we introduce the notation for
different sums of the generalized discount rates. We have for each t ∈ N:
8
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∆˜(t) := 1−∆f (2t+ 1) +
∞∑
m=t
(1−∆f (2m+ 3))
m∏
j=t
∆u(2j + 2)∆f (2j + 1) (27)
∆(t) := 1−∆u(2t+ 2) +
∞∑
m=t
(1−∆u(2m+ 4))
m∏
j=t
∆u(2j + 2)∆f (2j + 3) (28)
∆̂(t) := w0+(1−w0)
(
1−∆f (2t+ 1) +
∞∑
m=t
(1−∆f (2m+ 3))
m∏
j=t
∆f (2j + 1)∆f (2j + 2)
)
(29)
∆˘(t) := (1− w0)
(
1−∆f (2t+ 2) +
∞∑
m=t
(1−∆f (2m+ 4))
m∏
j=t
∆f (2j + 2)∆f (2j + 3)
)
(30)
When we consider the model with constant discount rates, i.e., δu,t = δu and δf,t = δf
for each t ∈ N, we get for every t ∈ N
∆˜(t) =
1− δf
1− δuδf
, ∆(t) =
1− δu
1− δuδf
, ∆̂(t) =
1 + w0δf
1 + δf
, ∆˘(t) =
1− w0
1 + δf
Our first results present the supremum of the union’s SPE payoffs in any even period
and the infimum of the firm’s SPE payoffs in any odd period for the particular cases
with ∆u(2t + 2) ≤ ∆f (2t + 2) for every t ∈ N: when either the strike is always credible
(Proposition 3(i)) or the strike is never credible (Proposition 3(ii)).
Proposition 3 Let ∆u(2t+ 2) ≤ ∆f (2t+ 2) for every t ∈ N.
(i) If for every t ∈ N[
w0 + (1− w0)∆u(2t+ 2)∆˜(t+ 1)
]
∆u(2t+ 1) ≥ w0 (31)
then
M2tu = w0 + (1− w0)∆˜(t) (32)
m2t+1f = (1− w0)
[
1−∆u(2t+ 2)∆˜(t+ 1)
]
(33)
The SPE strategy profile that supports these M2tu and m
2t+1
f defined in (32) and (33)
is given by the following ‘generalized alternating strike strategies’:
– In period 2t the union proposes w0 + (1 − w0)∆˜(t), in period 2t + 1 it accepts an
offer y if and only if y ≥ w0 + (1− w0)∆u(2t+ 2)∆˜(t+ 1), it goes on strike after
rejection of its own proposals and holds out after rejecting firm’s offers.
– In period 2t+ 1 the firm proposes w0 + (1−w0)∆u(2t+ 2)∆˜(t+ 1), in period 2t it
accepts x if and only if x ≤ w0 + (1− w0)∆˜(t).
9
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– If, however, at some point, the union deviates from the above rule, then both parties
play thereafter according to the following ‘minimum-wage strategies’:
- The union always proposes w0, accepts y if and only if y ≥ w0, and never goes
on strike.
- The firm always proposes w0 and accepts x if and only if x ≤ w0.
(ii) If for every t ∈ N[
w0 + (1− w0)∆u(2t+ 2)∆˜(t+ 1)
]
∆u(2t+ 1) < w0 (34)
then
M2tu = w0 and m
2t+1
f = 1− w0 (35)
The SPE strategy profile that supports these M2tu and m
2t+1
f defined in (35) is given
by the minimum-wage strategies.
For the proof of Proposition 3, see the Appendix.
Note that our Proposition 3 generalizes the corresponding results on Mu and mf for
the model with constant discount rates presented in Houba and Wen (2008) (Proposition
3). When we consider the model with constant discount rates, i.e., we put δu,t = δu and
δf,t = δf for each t ∈ N, and we assume that δu ≤ δf , we get for every t ∈ N
M2tu = w0 +
(1− w0)(1− δf )
1− δuδf
, m2t+1f =
(1− w0)(1− δu)
1− δuδf
and the strike credibility condition (31) is equivalent to
(1− w0)δ
2
u + w0δu − w0 ≥ δuδf (δu − w0)
Our next results concern some particular cases when the the generalized discount rate
of the union is always greater than the generalized discount rate of the firm in the same
even period. Three particular cases are considered.
Proposition 4 Let ∆u(2t+ 2) > ∆f (2t+ 2) for every t ∈ N.
(i) If for every t ∈ N (
1−∆(t)
)
∆u(2t+ 1) ≥ w0 (36)
and
∆˜(t+ 1) (∆u(2t+ 2)−∆f (2t+ 2)) ≥ w0(1−∆f (2t+ 2)) (37)
then
M2tu = ∆˜(t) and m
2t+1
f = ∆(t) (38)
The SPE strategy profile that supports these M2tu and m
2t+1
f defined in (38) is given
by the following ‘always strike strategies’:
– In period 2t the union proposes ∆˜(t), in period 2t + 1 it accepts an offer y if and
only if y ≥ 1−∆(t), it always goes on strike if there is a disagreement.
– In period 2t+ 1 the firm proposes 1−∆(t), in period 2t it accepts x if and only if
x ≤ ∆˜(t).
– If, however, at some point, the union deviates from the above rule, then both parties
play thereafter according to the ‘minimum-wage strategies’.
10
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(ii) If for every t ∈ N (
1− ∆˘(t)
)
∆u(2t+ 1) ≥ w0 (39)
and
∆̂(t+ 1) (∆u(2t+ 2)−∆f (2t+ 2)) < w0(1−∆f (2t+ 2)) (40)
then
M2tu = ∆̂(t) and m
2t+1
f = ∆˘(t) (41)
The SPE strategy profile that supports these M2tu and m
2t+1
f defined in (41) is given
by the following ‘modified generalized alternating strike strategies’:
– In period 2t the union proposes ∆̂(t), in period 2t + 1 it accepts an offer y if and
only if y ≥ (1−∆u(2t+2))w0 +∆u(2t+2)∆̂(t+1), it strikes in even periods and
holds out in odd periods if no agreement is reached.
– In period 2t+1 the firm proposes 0, in period 2t it accepts x if and only if x ≤ ∆̂(t).
– If, however, at some point, the union deviates from the above rule, then both parties
play thereafter according to the ‘minimum-wage strategies’.
(iii) If for every t ∈ N
M2t+2u (∆u(2t+ 2)−∆f (2t+ 2)) < w0(1−∆f (2t+ 2))
and
(1−m2t+1f )∆u(2t+ 1) < w0
then for each t ∈ N
M2tu = w0 and m
2t+1
f = 1− w0 (42)
The SPE strategy profile that supports these M2tu and m
2t+1
f defined in (42) is given
by the minimum-wage strategies.
For the proof of Proposition 4, see the Appendix.
Note that our Proposition 4 generalizes the corresponding results on Mu and mf for
the model with constant discount rates presented in Houba and Wen (2008) (Proposition
4). Consider the model with constant discount rates, i.e., let δu,t = δu and δf,t = δf for
each t ∈ N, and assume that δu > δf . Then for Proposition 4(i), we get for every t ∈ N
M2tu =
1− δf
1− δuδf
, m2t+1f =
1− δu
1− δuδf
and the strike credibility conditions (36) and (37) are equivalent to the set C in Houba
and Wen (2008):
(δu − w0)δf ≤
δ2u − w0
δu
and δf ≤
δu − w0
1− w0δu
respectively. For Proposition 4(ii), we get for every t ∈ N
M2tu =
1 + w0δf
1 + δf
, m2t+1f =
1− w0
1 + δf
and the conditions (39) and (40) are equivalent to the set B in Houba and Wen (2008):
δf (δu − w0) ≥ w0(1− δu) and δf >
δu − w0
1− δuw0
11
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.11
In Propositions 3 and 4, M2tu and m
2t+1
f for every t ∈ N are determined for several
cases where particular conditions on the discount rates of both parties are satisfied. In
order to calculate M2tu and m
2t+1
f for an arbitrary case, we can proceed as follows. Given
the sequences of discount rates (δu,t)t∈N and (δf,t)t∈N, we also obtain the sequences of
the generalized discount rates (∆u(t))t∈N and (∆f (t))t∈N. Depending on which conditions
hold, we apply Fact 1 to determine the infinite sequence of necessary conditions for M2tu
and m2t+1f for every t ∈ N. Note that we get always an infinite regular triangular system
of equations which has a unique solution, being the sequence (M2tu ,m
2t+1
f )t∈N. However,
the solution does not always satisfy the required conditions. To see that consider the case
where for every t ∈ N,
∆u(t) > ∆f (t), (1−m
2t+1
f )∆u(2t+ 1) < w0 and
M2t+2u (∆u(2t+ 2)−∆f (2t+ 2)) ≥ w0(1−∆f (2t+ 2))
Then, solving for every t ∈ N
M2tu = w0(1−∆u(2t+ 1)) + (1−m
2t+1
f )∆u(2t+ 1) and m
2t+1
f = 1−M
2t+2
u ∆u(2t+ 2)
leads to
M2tu = w0
(
1−∆u(2t+ 1) +
∞∑
m=t
(1−∆u(2m+ 3))
m∏
j=t
∆u(2j + 1)∆u(2j + 2)
)
but this means that M2tu < w0, and therefore we get a contradiction.
Similarly, consider the case where for every t ∈ N,
∆u(2t+1) ≤ ∆f (2t+1), ∆u(2t+2) > ∆f (2t+2), (1−m
2t+1
f )∆u(2t+1) < w0 and
M2t+2u (∆u(2t+ 2)−∆f (2t+ 2)) ≥ w0(1−∆f (2t+ 2))
Then, solving for every t ∈ N
M2tu = w0(1−∆f (2t+ 1)) + (1−m
2t+1
f )∆f (2t+ 1) and m
2t+1
f = 1−M
2t+2
u ∆u(2t+ 2)
leads to M2tu = w0∆˜(t) < w0, and therefore we get again a contradiction.
5 Conclusion
We calculated the equilibrium payoffs for the wage bargaining model between the union
and the firm with preferences of the parties expressed by discount rates varying in time.
We extended the analysis presented in Houba and Wen (2008) for the wage bargaining
with constant discount rates. We focused on determining the supremum of the union’s
payoff and the infimum of the firm’s payoff under SPE in all periods when the given
party makes its offer. While we described the necessary conditions for these payoffs for
arbitrary sequences of discount rates, we determined them and the supporting equilibria
only for some particular (representative) cases of sequences of discount rates varying in
12
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.11
time. In all these equilibria, the agreement is reached immediately in period 0. In a follow-
up research on the wage bargaining with sequences of discount rates varying in time it
would be interesting to analyze the existence of inefficient SPE with a strike for some
periods followed by an agreement. Another issue in our future research agenda is to see
how our results would be affected if not only the union could go on strike or holdout,
but also the firm could lock out. We would like also to apply the model to one of the
important economic issues – pharmaceutical product price determination; see e.g. Jelovac
(2005); Garcia-Marinoso et al. (2011).
Appendix - Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider an arbitrary t ∈ N.
(1) Suppose that strike is not credible, i.e., (1−m2t+1f )∆u(2t+ 1) < w0.
We have (9a) ≥ (9b) if and only if
w0(1−∆f (2t+1))+(1−m
2t+1
f )∆f (2t+1) ≥ w0(1−∆u(2t+1))+(1−m
2t+1
f )∆u(2t+1) ⇔
(1−m2t+1f − w0)∆f (2t+ 1) ≥ (1−m
2t+1
f − w0)∆u(2t+ 1)
As 1−m2t+1f − w0 ≥ 0, this establishes the second and the third cases of (14).
(2) Suppose that strike is credible, i.e., (1 −m2t+1f )∆u(2t + 1) ≥ w0. Then, (9c) ≥ (9a).
Moreover, (9c) ≥ (9b), because (9c) ≥ (9b) if and only if
1−m2t+1f ∆f (2t+ 1) ≥ w0(1−∆u(2t+ 1)) + (1−m
2t+1
f )∆u(2t+ 1) ⇔
(1− w0)(1−∆u(2t+ 1)) ≥ m
2t+1
f (∆f (2t+ 1)−∆u(2t+ 1))
which is always true, since m2t+1f ≤ 1− w0. Then, we obtain the first case of (14). 
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider an arbitrary t ∈ N.
(1) Assume that ∆u(2t+ 2) ≤ ∆f (2t+ 2). We have
1−w0(1−∆f (2t+2))−M
2t+2
u ∆f (2t+2) = 1−M
2t+2
u +(M
2t+2
u −w0)(1−∆f (2t+2)) ≤
1−M2t+2u + (M
2t+2
u − w0)(1−∆u(2t+ 2)) = 1− w0(1−∆u(2t+ 2))−M
2t+2
u ∆u(2t+ 2)
Hence, (18a) ≥ (18b). Moreover, (18c) > (18a), and we get the third case of (21).
(2) Assume that ∆u(2t+ 2) > ∆f (2t+ 2). Then (18b) > (18a). Moreover, (18c) > (18b)
if and only if
w0(1−∆f (2t+ 2)) +M
2t+2
u ∆f (2t+ 2) > M
2t+2
u ∆u(2t+ 2) ⇔
M2t+2u (∆u(2t+ 2)−∆f (2t+ 2)) < w0(1−∆f (2t+ 2))
which gives the second case of (21). On the other hand, if
M2t+2u (∆u(2t+ 2)−∆f (2t+ 2)) ≥ w0(1−∆f (2t+ 2))
13
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then (18c) ≤ (18b) and the strike is credible, because
M2t+2u ∆u(2t+ 2)− w0 ≥M
2t+2
u ∆f (2t+ 2) + w0(1−∆f (2t+ 2))− w0 =
= ∆f (2t+ 2)(M
2t+2
u − w0) ≥ 0
We get then the first case of (21). 
Proof of Proposition 3
Let ∆u(2t+ 2) ≤ ∆f (2t+ 2) for every t ∈ N.
(i) Consider the case when the strike is always credible, i.e., (1−m2t+1f )∆u(2t+ 1) ≥ w0
for every t ∈ N. From Fact 1 we have for every t ∈ N:
M2tu +m
2t+1
f ∆f (2t+ 1) = 1 and m
2t+1
f +M
2t+2
u ∆u(2t+ 2) = 1− w0(1−∆u(2t+ 2))
which is a regular triangular system AX = Y , with A = [aij]i,j∈N+ , X = [(xi)i∈N+ ]
T ,
Y = [(yi)i∈N+ ]
T , where for each t, j ≥ 1
at,t = 1, at,j = 0 for j < t or j > t+ 1
and for each t ∈ N
a2t+1,2t+2 = ∆f (2t+ 1), a2t+2,2t+3 = ∆u(2t+ 2)
x2t+1 =M
2t
u , x2t+2 = m
2t+1
f , y2t+1 = 1, y2t+2 = 1− w0(1−∆u(2t+ 2))
Any regular triangular matrix A possesses the (unique) inverse matrix B, i.e., there exists
B such that BA = I, where I is the infinite identity matrix. The matrix B = [bij]i,j∈N+
is also regular triangular, and its elements are the following:
bt,t = 1, bt,j = 0 for each t, j ≥ 1 such that j < t
b2t+1,2t+2 = −∆f (2t+ 1), b2t+2,2t+3 = −∆u(2t+ 2) for each t ∈ N
and for each t,m ∈ N and m > t
b2t+1,2m+1 =
m−1∏
j=t
∆f (2j+1)∆u(2j+2), b2t+1,2m+2 = −
m−1∏
j=t
∆f (2j+1)∆u(2j+2)∆f (2m+1)
b2t+2,2m+2 =
m−1∏
j=t
∆u(2j+2)∆f (2j+3), b2t+2,2m+3 = −
m−1∏
j=t
∆u(2j+2)∆f (2j+3)∆u(2m+2)
Next, by applying X = BY we get M2tu as given in (32) and m
2t+1
f as given in (33). The
strike credibility condition (1 −m2t+1f )∆u(2t + 1) ≥ w0 for every t ∈ N is then written
as in (31). In Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2014) (Proposition 4) we show that under an
equivalently expressed condition (31) and ∆u(2t + 2) ≤ ∆f (2t + 2) for every t ∈ N, the
proposed strategy profile (formed by the generalized alternating strike strategies) is a
SPE.
14
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(ii) Consider the case when the strike is never credible, i.e., (1−m2t+1f )∆u(2t + 1) < w0
for every t ∈ N. Then we have the infinite system for t ∈ N
M2tu +m
2t+1
f ∆f (2t+ 1) = w0(1−∆f (2t+ 1)) +∆f (2t+ 1)
or
M2tu +m
2t+1
f ∆u(2t+ 1) = w0(1−∆u(2t+ 1)) +∆u(2t+ 1)
and
m2t+1f +M
2t+2
u ∆u(2t+ 2) = 1− w0(1−∆u(2t+ 2))
which as a regular triangular system possesses a unique solution. This solution is given
by (35). It is supported by the minimum-wage strategies profile which is a SPE as shown
in Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2014) (Fact 3). 
Proof of Proposition 4
Let ∆u(2t+ 2) > ∆f (2t+ 2) for every t ∈ N.
(i) Consider the case when for every t ∈ N, (1 − m2t+1f )∆u(2t + 1) ≥ w0 (i.e., strike is
credible in period 2t) and condition (25) holds. If (25) is satisfied, then strike is credible
in period 2t+ 1. From Fact 1 we get the infinite system for every t ∈ N
M2tu +m
2t+1
f ∆f (2t+ 1) = 1 and m
2t+1
f +M
2t+2
u ∆u(2t+ 2) = 1
which is is a regular triangular system AX = Y , with A = [aij]i,j∈N+ and X = [(xi)i∈N+ ]
T
the same as in the proof of Proposition 3, and with Y = [(yi)i∈N+ ]
T such that y2t+1 =
y2t+2 = 1. The (unique) inverse matrix B is the same as before, and by applying X = BY
we get M2tu and m
2t+1
f as given by (38). The conditions (1−m
2t+1
f )∆u(2t+ 1) ≥ w0 and
(25) are equivalent to (36) and (37). In Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2014) (Proposition 3)
we show that the proposed strategy profile (formed by the ‘always strike strategies’) is a
SPE under an equivalently expressed condition (36).
(ii) Consider the case when for every t ∈ N, (1 −m2t+1f )∆u(2t + 1) ≥ w0 (i.e., strike is
credible in period 2t) and condition (26) holds. Then, we solve the infinite system for
every t ∈ N
M2tu +m
2t+1
f ∆f (2t+ 1) = 1 and m
2t+1
f +M
2t+2
u ∆f (2t+ 2) = 1− w0(1−∆f (2t+ 2))
which is a regular triangular system AX = Y . By applying X = BY we get M2tu and
m2t+1f as given by (41). The conditions (1−m
2t+1
f )∆u(2t+1) ≥ w0 and (26) are equivalent
to (39) and (40). In Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2014) (Theorem 3) we show that if
∆u(2t + 2) > ∆f (2t + 2) for each t ∈ N, then the proposed strategy profile (formed
by the ‘modified generalized alternating strike strategies’) is a SPE under the following
condition:
w0 ≤ ∆u(2t+ 1)
(
(1−∆u(2t+ 2))w0 +∆u(2t+ 2)W
2t+2
)
(43)
where
W 2t =
1 +
∑
∞
m=t δf (2t+ 1, 2m+ 2) + w0
∑
∞
m=t δf (2t+ 1, 2m+ 1)
1 +
∑
∞
m=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1,m)
15
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is the SPE offer of the union proposed in period 2t. One can show thatW 2t =M2tu = ∆̂(t):
W 2t = w0 + (1− w0)
(
1 +
∑
∞
m=t δf (2t+ 1, 2m+ 2)
1 +
∑
∞
m=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1,m)
)
=
= w0 + (1− w0)
(
1−∆f (2t+ 1) +
∑
∞
m=t δf (2t+ 1, 2m+ 2)
1 +
∑
∞
m=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1,m)
)
=
= w0+(1−w0)
(
1−∆f (2t+ 1) +
∞∑
m=t
(1−∆f (2m+ 3))
m∏
j=t
∆f (2j + 1)∆f (2j + 2)
)
= ∆̂(t)
Moreover, note that (39) implies condition (43):
w0 ≤ ∆u(2t+ 1)
(
1− ∆˘(t)
)
=
= ∆u(2t+ 1)
[
w0 + (1− w0)
(
∆f (2t+ 2)−
∞∑
m=t
(1−∆f (2m+ 4))
m∏
j=t
∆f (2j + 2)∆f (2j + 3)
)]
= ∆u(2t+1)
[
w0 + (1− w0)∆f (2t+ 2)
(
1−∆f (2t+ 3) +
∞∑
m=t+1
(1−∆f (2m+ 3))
m∏
j=t+1
∆f (2j + 1)∆f (2j + 2)
)]
= ∆u(2t+ 1)
(
w0 +∆f (2t+ 2)(∆̂(t+ 1)− w0)
)
<
< ∆u(2t+ 1)
(
w0 +∆u(2t+ 2)(∆̂(t+ 1)− w0)
)
=
= ∆u(2t+ 1)
(
(1−∆u(2t+ 2))w0 +∆u(2t+ 2)∆̂(t+ 1)
)
(iii) Consider the case when for every t ∈ N,
(1−m2t+1f )∆u(2t+ 1) < w0 and M
2t+2
u (∆u(2t+ 2)−∆f (2t+ 2)) < w0(1−∆f (2t+ 2))
Then, from Fact 1 we get the infinite system for every t ∈ N
M2tu +m
2t+1
f ∆u(2t+ 1) = w0 +∆u(2t+ 1)(1− w0)
or
M2tu +m
2t+1
f ∆f (2t+ 1) = w0 +∆f (2t+ 1)(1− w0)
and
m2t+1f +M
2t+2
u ∆f (2t+ 2) = 1− w0(1−∆f (2t+ 2))
which is is a regular triangular system AX = Y with the solution M2tu = w0 and m
2t+1
f =
1−w0 for each t ∈ N. The SPE supporting this solution is the minimum-wage strategies
profile. 
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Period
0 Union: Propose x0
?
Firm: Accept/Reject
 
 
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@
@
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Y N
Game ends
(x0, 1− x0)
Union: Strike / No Strike
(0, 0) (w0, 1− w0)
 
 
  	
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?
Union: Accept/Reject
 
 
  	
@
@
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Y N
Game ends
(y1, 1− y1)
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 
 
  	
2 Union: Propose x2
etc.
Figure 1: Non-cooperative bargaining game between the union and the firm
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